Co-operation within and between species has generated only one Evolutionary Stable Strategy: TIT FOR TAT.
The importance of TIT FOR TAT to the evolution of co-operative behaviour was discovered through a worldwide computer competition to find the winning strategy for the well known paradox 'The Prisoner's Dilemma'.
In 1981 TIT FOR TAT won that competition, and ever since then it has grown in stature to where it now dominates our thinking about the evolution of co-operative behaviour in animal and human societies.
According to Axelrod, TIT FOR TAT is a successful strategy because it is 'nice', 'provokable' and 'forgiving'.
A nice strategy is one which is never first to defect. In a match between two nice strategies, both do well.
A provokable strategy responds by defecting at once in response to defection.
A forgiving strategy is one which readily returns to co-operation if its opponent does so; unforgiving strategies are likely to produce isolation and end co-operative encounters.
Since the appearance of TIT FOR TAT as a model for the evolution of co-operation, there have been many strategies derived from it: TIT FOR TWO TATS, SUSPICIOUS TIT FOR TAT and ALWAYS DEFECT to name just three. Under varying conditions all achieve some success but none demonstrate the robustness of TIT FOR TAT. However the real proof of this
theory is in nature where TIT FOR TAT is beginning to be identified.
The importance of TIT FOR TAT to the evolution of co-operative behaviour was discovered through a worldwide computer competition to find the winning strategy for the well known paradox 'The Prisoner's Dilemma'.
In 1981 TIT FOR TAT won that competition, and ever since then it has grown in stature to where it now dominates our thinking about the evolution of co-operative behaviour in animal and human societies.
According to Axelrod, TIT FOR TAT is a successful strategy because it is 'nice', 'provokable' and 'forgiving'.
A nice strategy is one which is never first to defect. In a match between two nice strategies, both do well.
A provokable strategy responds by defecting at once in response to defection.
A forgiving strategy is one which readily returns to co-operation if its opponent does so; unforgiving strategies are likely to produce isolation and end co-operative encounters.
Since the appearance of TIT FOR TAT as a model for the evolution of co-operation, there have been many strategies derived from it: TIT FOR TWO TATS, SUSPICIOUS TIT FOR TAT and ALWAYS DEFECT to name just three. Under varying conditions all achieve some success but none demonstrate the robustness of TIT FOR TAT. However the real proof of this
theory is in nature where TIT FOR TAT is beginning to be identified. 
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